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ABSTRACT 
This paper was written for, and (in part) presented at, a 
symposium at McKenna College in which Mr. Calabresi took part. The 
paper begins with a discussion of a number of ambiguities in the 
treatment of choice in Calabresi and Bobbit's Tragic Choices and then 
proceeds to develop in two different, but I think complementary, 
directions. On the one hand, I use their shifts of position as an 
occasion, or opportunity, to work out what seems to me a more realistic 
account of how decision-makers choose among the alternatives they 
encounter. On the other hand, I suggest that the shifts of position 
that are visible at the surface of the argument are traceable to deeper 
tensions among the unstated, and perhaps not fully recognized, 
metaphysical presuppositions on which the argument rests. 
IMPOSSIBLE CHOICES* 
W. T. Jones 
Any book that, like Tragic Choices,! places itself deliberately 
and boldly at the intersection of economics, law, the policy sciences 
and moral philosophy is certain to provoke critical response. Even God 
himself could hardly write a book that would meet the diverse demands 
and satisfy the diverse criteria of all these disciplines. It is easy, 
for instance, for a philosopher to point out philosophical weaknesses 
in Tragic Choices--for instance, to point a finger at the ambiguities 
in Calabresi and Bobbit's treatment of choice--but hardly worth doing 
so if one confined oneself merely to exposing the shifts in position 
that occur. I shall therefore use these ambiguities as an occasion, an 
opportunity, to work out what seems to me a more realistic account of 
how decision-makers deal with different kinds of choice situations. I 
shall show that though Calabresi and Bobbit's rather timid criticism of 
the rational choice model is a step in the right direction, it is only 
a very small first step. That is the first theme of this essay. The 
second is a demonstration of what may be called the method of 
philosophical archaeology.2 Starting from those same ambiguities that 
appear at the surface of Calabresi and Bobbit's treatment of choice I 
shall seek to uncover the implicit metaphysical and epistemological 
presuppositions on which their argument rests. 
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Specifically I shall suggest that Calabresi and Bobbit's 
situation with respect to the moral universe is not unlike Kant's with 
respect to the physical universe. Kant had started life as a confident 
Cartesian rationalist, and was woken from his dogmatic slumbers by 
reading Hume. The Critique of Pure Reason was the result. I suspect 
that the authors of Tragic Choices started life confident that moral 
world is rational and well ordered, that is, that disagreement about 
what one ought to do at any decision point can always in principle be 
terminated by showing that one of the options is better--in the sense 
of being productive of more utiles, or more pleasures, or more 
satisfactions--than any available alternative. I do not know who woke 
our present authors from their dogmatic slumbers, but woken they surely 
were. At some point they must have made the shocking (I use this term 
advisedly) discovery that the moral world is not quite so rational as 
they had believed it to be: there are some choice points, and 
unfortunately they are important ones, at which there is no decisively 
good reason for selecting one option over the other available options. 
Tragic Choices is the result of this revelation. 
But Tragic Choices differs in an important way from Kant's 
Critique. Kant undertook a transcendental deduction that (at least in 
his view) rehabilitated physics and so reassured him that the physical 
world is national "after all." Calabresi and Bobbit have not--at least 
not in this volume�undertaken a corresponding rehabilitation of moral 
rationality, nor have they yet reconciled themselves to its loss. The 
result is a series of shifts in position as they move back and forth 
between accepting and revolting against the flaw they have discovered 
in their moral universe. 
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Although I confine myself to Tragic Choices and to trying to 
explain some of what is going on in that book that is otherwise 
puzzling, I hope that my paper will have a larger interest. Inasmuch 
as there are many moral philosophers who share our authors' ambivalence 
about rationality claims but who have buried that ambivalence more 
deeply than they have managed to bury it, I believe my analysis may 
indirectly throw light on some rather widespread features of the 
contemporary philosophical culture. 
But before -1 can get to the topic of this paper-those shifts 
in position that are symptoms of the ambivalence I detect--! must set· 
out wnat I take to be the defining properties of tragic choices, as 
Calabresi and Bobbit understand them. This exposition is necessary 
because they have chosen--unaccountably in view of the importance of 
the concept--to rely on examples, rather than "attempt a simple 
detinition" (p. 17), thus leaving their readers uncertain whether the 
definition they have extracted from the Calabresi and Bobbit examples 
is the one embedded in them.3 I shall start by distinguishing among 
difficult choices, easy choices, and what I shall call impossible 
choices. 
Difficult choices, or Type I choices, are those for which we 
have a criterion that we think is applicable to both (all) options open 
to us at the time we need to choose, but where the criterion is hard to 
apply either because the fit is loose between the criterion and one or 
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more of the options or because the distance between the options is 
small. From difficult choices we may distinguish Type II, or easy, 
choices--those in which (i) the distance between the options is so 
great that we hardly have to apply the criterion--we can "eyeball it"­
or those in which (ii) there is a good fit between the criterion and 
the options. 
One useful-and therefore widely used--criterion is price, 
expressed in, say, dollars. Choices for which this criterion is 
thought to be appropriate are u·sually easy. Since many people 
experience indecision--the period between the first presentation of 
options and the onset of behavior-as uncomfortable or even anxiety 
producing, there is a widespread tendency to apply the pricing 
criterion in situations in which people with a higher tolerance for 
cognitive dissonance might regard the pricing criterion as 
inappropriate. In any case, choices that can be priced become 
difficult only when there is a failure of fit--for instance, when there 
is no market for the equity we are thinking of selling or for the one 
we are thinking of buying. (A choice under this criterion could also 
become difficult if the decisionmaker were terribly fussy about small 
differences, about, say, the difference between a price of $.99 and 
$1.00, but in that event he could transfer to pricing in terms of 
Italian lire.) 
If one chooses option A over option B and one's choice is 
challenged, one proceeds to justify it by showing that in terms of 
such-and-such a criterion (e.g., price) A was better (e.g., cheaper) 
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than the price of B. If one's criterion is challenged, one justifies 
it by showing that, in terms of some second order criterion, the 
criterion one used was better (e.g., more appropriate) in these 
circumstances than any alternative criterion. Justifying one's choice 
in this way amounts to showing that it was "rational"; any other choice 
in this situation under this criterion would, one says, have been 
irrational. Since few people want to be thought irrational, still less 
want to think themselves irrational, most people exhaustively divide 
the world of choice into difficult and easy choices. All choices would 
then be iu principle (as people say) rational, even if on occasion 
someone makes an irrational choice as a result of bungling, haste or 
weakness o± will. 
Are there choices that are neither easy (Type I) nor difficult 
(Type II)? I believe that there are. There are choices that have to 
be made between incommensurate options, those, that is, for which no 
common criterion is available. These Type II, or impossible, choices 
are neither difficult nor easy; they are impossible. It is not the 
case of course, when we face two incommensurate options, that we do 
nothing; we are not--at least, not often--like Buridan's ass who, being 
incapable of making a rational choice between his two options, starved 
to death. Since human beings are by no means so rational as asses, our 
hesitation between an A and an incommensurate B sooner or later issues 
in behavior. But since we want to be rational, we often experience 
considerable strain in the period of hesitation, and this strain may 
manifest itself, as in the case of the rats who had to jump but who 
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could no longer distinguish between the doors that were their options, 
in a human version o± "jumping high and to the right.114 
My present point, however, is not to describe the sorts of 
things people do when confronted with impossible choices; it is simply 
to note that, whether one goes for A or for B or for some unexpected Z, 
one cannot justify that behavior, either to others--or, worse, to 
oneself--by showing that, according to whatever criterion one has 
adopted, the option adopted was "better" than any available alternative 
and that was the reason it was adopted. Thus, though people always do 
something in impossible situations, it cannot be that they chose what 
they did, because by definition they had no basis for making a choice. 
Nevertheless, people are prone to assimilate this kind of situation to 
a situation in which they actually make a choice because in both kinds 
of situations there is hesitation, followed by a behavioral outcome, 
and because the culture, still dominated by an inherited rationalist 
bias, expects people to have a "good reason" for all that they do. 
This brings me to Tragic Choices. I believe Calabresi and 
Bobbit will accept my account of "difficult" choices, and I think that 
what I call "easy" choices overlap with, but certainly do not coincide 
with, their "trivial" choices. But since they do not even give us 
examples of these kinds of choices--they mention them only to dismiss 
them from consideration--I cannot be sure. Finally, I believe that 
their tragic choices are examples of what I call impossible choices. 
At least, the kinds ot situations they describe as tragic--choosing 
between saving the lives of people suffering from kidney failure and 
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saving the lives of people who need marrow transplants, deciding what 
groups to expose to the risk of losing their lives in a war and what 
groups to protect from those risks�are just the kinds of situations I 
call impossible. That is, no criterion is available that would enable 
us to choose between the options�say, the lives of people who need 
kidney machines and the lives of people who need marrow transplants--in 
such a way that our choice, whichever it proves to be, could be 
rationally justified. 
I do not want to get entangled at this stage in what may look 
like--but is not--a mere semantic difference between our authors and 
myself. Accordingly, instead of using their "tragic" or my 
"impossible" to describe these choices I shall for the present refer to 
them neutrally as Type III choices, that is, choices where no common 
metric is available for comparing (weighing against each other) the 
alternatives that are open to us. 
It is not clear to me whether Calabresi and Bobbit believe in 
what I shall call criterion incommensurability as well as in 
application incommensurability. Criterion incommensurability would 
occur if there were no ultimate, metacriterion in terms of which 
choices among different criteria--say, utility and rights--could be 
justified. I see no signs that Calabresi and Bobbit have faced this 
question--! suspect they have conveniently assumed a utilitarian, or 
consequentialist, metacriterion. But without some such metacriterion 
they are stuck with incommensurability at the criterion level, which 
might be thought to "infect" the level of application. This would be a 
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serious flaw in their moral universe. However that may be, since they 
ignore the possibility of criterion-incommensurability and concentrate 
on incommensurability at the level of application, I shall follow them 
and confine myself to arguing that even at the level of application 
there are a lot more incommensurate values than they recognize. 
Calabresi and Bobbit, for their part, hold that there are but 
twos incommensurate values, life and equality. The only Type III
choices they allow, therefore, are choices involving these two values, 
and they further limit the sphere of arationality first by confining 
Type III choices to what they call the first-order level of decision 
and then by trying--unsuccessfully, I think--to minimize the effect of 
this first-order arationality on the second order level. Thus 
Calabresi and Bobbit are reluctant critics of rational choice theory. 
They allow that there are Type III choices--indeed, the whole book is 
devoted to pointing out and developing the consequences of the fact 
that there are Type III choices--but they wish things were otherwise. 
Indeed, they wish so strongly that things were otherwise that not 
infrequently (or so it seems to me) they forget that on their own view 
things are not otherwise. As a result, their attitude toward the fact 
of incommensurability is strikingly ambivalent. They accept it as a 
fact of life but regard it as abnormal and shocking, something whose 
presence in the world they alternate between minimizing and deploring. 
One might say that Calabresi and Bobbit alternate between trying to 
neat things up by sweeping most of the arationality in the world under 
the rug and hauling it out to demonstrate to the rational choice 
philosophers that things are not as neat as those philosophers think 
they are. 
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The Calabresi and Bobbit ambivalence is visible in the basic 
strategy of their book: "The object of public policy must be • • •  to 
define that combination of approaches which most limit tragedy and 
which deals with the irreducible minimum in the least offensive way" 
(p. 149). Thus, sometimes they emphasize that current allocation 
procedures can be improved by the application of intelligence; by the 
use or reason the procedures can be made more rational. At these times 
they sound much like rational choice theorists. They make derogatory 
remarks about "tinkering" and about merely "customary approaches" 
(p. 176), and seem to forget that they believe choices involving life 
and equality cannot be brought within the scope of a rational scheme. 
On the other hand, when Calabresi and Bobbit recall that this is the 
case, they suggest that "a simple, muddled, collective determination 
may be preferable" (p. 109), and emphasize that "we are not making 
models for economists." Instead, "we may decide that what works all 
right for the mass of the citizens is the best we can do" (p. 1 12). In 
a word, so far from aiming at allocations that are systematically 
organized because they are based on a rational principle, we would do 
well to settle for allocations that reflect public opinion, whatever 
that happens to be. 
Calabresi and Bobbits attitude toward Burke is a symptom of 
this ambivalence. They rightly describe Burke as "a forceful 
apologist" for the tinkering approach to the problem of dealing with 
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social change. But Burke himself and this comment are relegated to a 
footnote (note 23, p. 205) and the quotation from Burke, unidentified 
in the text, is referred to very neutrally as one "possible reply" to 
the advocates ot systematic, long-range planning. This tactic allows 
our authors to acknowledge the existence of disagreement on one of the 
central issues they should be facing but to do so in a way that leaves 
them uncommitted one way or the other. It is as if one part of 
Calabresi's and Bobbit's minds are saying to them, "Look, you know that 
custom is the best you can get. Why not say so?" while another part is 
saying, "Well, if it is, that's a scandal!" As we read their book the 
text seems to harken first to one of these voices, then to the other. 
Occasionally, as in this passage, when they hear both at once, they are 
in effect silent, rather like an individual hesitating between 
incommensurate options. 
Ambivalence is also reflected in Calabresi and Bobbit's 
treatment of their so-called first-order decisions. For the purposes 
of this discussion I shall distinguish between what I shall call 
original allocations and initial allocations. An original allocation-­
I follow Rawls at a respectful distance here--is one those in which the 
actual allocations are fair, and I suppose that there can be but one 
such original position, the one that is "really" fair. An initial 
allocation is just the one that is in effect now--now in 1984, now in 
1 8 84, now in 1784. In a word, it is the allocation that happens 
to be in effect at the time at which people begin to consider whether 
this allocation could be improved. 
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Calabresi and Bobbit know, at one level of their minds--that 
is, one of those two voices is telling them�that there can be no 
original allocation in the sense defined; there can be no allocation of 
incommensurate values that is really fair in the sense that reasons can 
be given which justify this allocation against all other possible 
allocations. It would seem sensible, then, to concentrate on the 
current initial allocation and on how this allocation can be brought 
closer to the currently accepted set of values, for, though current 
allocations reflect current values, allocations and values are always 
to some extent out of phase. And a good deal of the discussion of 
conscription and of population policy in Chapter 6 presupposes this 
empirical and relativist approach. But some of the time Calabresi and 
Bobbit listen to the other voice, the one that wants them to 
distinguish between "the ultimate allocation of [a] good," which sounds 
like Rawls, 6 and various "historical allocations of that good" 
(p. 168). And when they are listening to this voice they tell us that 
"we must determine where 
• a decision - • •  was made as a result of 
which the resource was permitted to remain scarce" (pp. 150-151). This 
implies that there is a correct, ideal nontemporal allocation from 
which all actual, historical allocations unfortunately deviate because 
they result from the pulling and hauling of various pressure groups. 
Similarly, as regards this matter of pulling and hauling: part 
of the time Calabresi and Bobbit, writing in their empirical mode, 
discuss the way in which the availability of a scarce good "waxes and 
wanes" as the focus of 5ociety's attention shifts from one 
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incollDllensurate value to another (p. 196). An example is the way in 
which "the chance dramatization of a particular group" may "suffice to 
bring about a discrete or quantum jump" in the allocation of a scarce 
resource" (pp. 142-143). (We may think of the effect of Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt's paralysis on the allocation of funds to polio 
research as an example.) Such shifts in allocation, they emphasize, 
are not likely to be stable. Indeed, an allocation process is a 
"complex and curious combination of custom, unorganized moral suasion 
and ad hoc market incentives" (p. 157). The picture presented in these 
passages is anything but that ot a pattern of developing allocations 
gradually approaching the "ultimate allocation." 
But the picture itself shifts. What Calabresi and Bobbit 
sometime see, sometimes even on the same page, is the picture of a 
pattern. There is, after all, an "historical dialectic" (p. 169) to 
the allocations. They follow a "cyclic strategy" (p. 195); the waxings 
and the wanings, appearances to the contrary, have "dialectical 
effects" (p. 171). Though "the threads that make up a culture are too 
intricate" for students of allocation processes to be able "to 
extricate their perception from the pattern of the fabric" (p. 167) 
there are nonetheless "traces of patterns, 'figure[s] in the carpet,'" 
which, as our authors tell us, they were looking for and presumably 
found in Chapter 6, even though they modestly admit that the results of 
that chapter are only "impressionistic sketches" (p. 191). 
It would be possible to cite many more examples of this 
�mbivalence, but since they seem to me to be recurring figures in the 
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carpet of the Calabresi/Bobbit argument I shall instead simply describe 
the pattern that I detect there. Like the rationalist philosophers 
Calabresi and Bobbit want a world in which good reasons can be found 
for all decisions, in which there are no Type III choices. However, 
they prize life and equality so highly that they exclude these values 
from the pricing process; these two values are supremely precious, 
i.e., priceless. But, so the argument runs, what is priceless cannot 
be priced, and what cannot be priced is by definition incommensurate. 
Hence choices involving these precious values are arational; people 
cannot give, because they cannot find, good reasons for choosing one 
allocation of these values over other possible allocations of them. On 
the one hand, Calabresi and Bobbit believe that societies which place a 
price on life or equality are "contemptible" (e.g., p. 144); on the 
other hand, they regard tragic choices, those involving priceless 
values, as "pathological" (e.g., p. 190). Calabresi and Bobbit are in 
a cleft stick. 
There are two possible ways for him to extricate himself from 
this uncomfortable posture, but I doubt if Mr. Calabresi will avail 
himself of either. One way out, and a plausible way out given one set 
of metaphysical assumptions, is simply to retreat to the pure 
rationalist position that (1) it is possible to price all values, 
includ{ng life and equality, (2) that people do as a matter of evident 
fact price life and equality all the time, different people assigning 
different values to life at different times, and (3) that it is 
precisely the people who can't, or who think they can't, price life, 
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who are "pathological." The other way out, which I recommend, is to 
recognize that the incommensurability of values, so far from being 
limited to two, or at most four, values, is a pervasive feature of our 
world, so much so that pricing is something that people, in distinction 
from economists, undertake only in rather special circumstances and for 
limited ends. If one looks at the world from this perspective social 
choices and the institutions which these choices generate look very 
different from the way they look in Tragic Choices. 
I want now first to show, at least briefly, how the world looks 
from this perspective--one in which the tragedy of tragic choices is 
much diminished by the prevalence of many different incommensurate 
vaiues and so of many, instead of only a very few, Type III choices. 
Second, I want, again briefly, to suggest why these different 
perspectives appeal to different people. 
I shall begin with a choice which I regard as a typical Type 
III choice. If I am presented with the option of seeing a Monet 
retrospective or seeing a Renoir retrospective--I can go to either 
exhibition, but not to both-- I have no problem; I like Monet enormously 
and dislike Renoir intensely. Thus this is an easy decision, but for 
me it is not one of Mr. Calabresi's trivial choices. If it is a matter 
of an option between Monet and Pissarro that too is easy--but in a very 
different sense of "easy": it is easy because I know that I shall 
enjoy whichever I attend and because I have no way of calculating which 
I will enjoy more. This, too, is a Type III choice--strictly speaking, 
nut a choice at all--and certainly not tragic. 
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There may be an interval of hesitation between the time I am 
offered the two options and the time I head for (say) the Pissarro 
show, and this interval may be prolonged. But it isn't filled by a 
process remotely like pricing, whether the pricing is done in dollars, 
in utiles, in "pleasures," or in "satisfaction." There isn't a 
process, or a calculation, or an election leading to a decision to go 
to the Pissarro; the behavior of setting out for the Pissarro simply 
emerges from the hesitation.7 I may terminate the period of hesitation 
by tossing a coin. Tossing a coin has a number of advantages. First, 
it effectively terminates the hesitation, which might otherwise prolong 
itself. Second, it is a kind of public acknowledgement that a good 
reason for choosing one exhibition over the other cannot be found: 
tossing a coin therefore relieves me from the need to invent ex post a 
good reason. In a word, the concept of a lottery is a very good 
representation of a person's situation at many choice points, and it is 
immaterial whether or not he recognizes this to be the case and 
actually tosses a coin. 
What pretty clearly happens in this and similar cases is 
exactly what happens in Calabresi/Bobbit tragic cases, where the 
options are, not the Monet show or the Pissarro show, but putting 
scarce resources into kidney machines or putting them into marrow 
transplants. The only difference--and this is certainly a considerable 
difference--is that I may agonize more over the latter impossible 
choice than over the former impossible choice, because I value life 
rather more highly than I value impressionist paintings. But I can 
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certainly conceive the possibility--indeed, the likelihood--that there 
are people who value impressionist paintings more than they value 
kidney machines and/or marrow transplants for other people, and such 
people may value impressionist paintings so much that they regard it as 
tragic that they must choose between the Monet and the Pissarro shows, 
just as Calabresi and Bobbit regard it as tragic that he must choose 
between kidney machines and marrow transplants. So, to judge from 
E. M. Forster's writings, he would not have regarded it as the least bit 
tragic if he had to choose between the U.K. and the U.N. but would have 
regarded it as very tragic indeed had he to choose between his duty to 
one friend and his duty to another. In a word, what makes choices 
tragic is not merely that the options involved are incommensurate but 
that they are highly prized. All tragic choices are Type III choices, 
but not all Type III choices are tragic. 
What would Calabresi and Bobbit say about such people--about 
E. M. Forster and my putative admirer of impressionist paintings? 
Would they say that they are mistaken or merely that they are 
different? Curiously enough, on this important point I have not been 
able to decide what their final view is. Again and again they make the 
flat assertion that life "is" priceless, alternatively, "is" sacred. 
If we take such assertions as considered--if they think life is 
priceless then they must hold those who deny that life is priceless, or 
who question whether it is priceless, to be mistaken, wrongheaded, 
obtuse, or insensitive. Yet towards the end of the book it turns out 
that there are societies that do not value life as much as our society 
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does, and that tragedy is "a cultural phenomenon" (p. 167). 
Consider, for instance, the Calabresi/Bobbit account of what 
they call "color": "By the term color we mean the capacity of the 
factor to arouse emotion. This quality does not inhere in the factor 
itself, but depends rather on each society's perception of it; it 
varies over time • • • " (p. 1 54). From this it surely follows that if 
society 81 regards some choice (say, the choice between kidney machines 
and marrow transplants) as tragic and another society 82 does not 
regard this choice as tragic, neither is mistaken. It is simply the 
case that 81 colors the value of life more highly at this time and in
these circumstances than does s2• It is quite possible that at another 
time and in other circumstances s2 will color this choice so highly 
that it will now regard it as a tragic choice and that s1 will no 
longer color it highly enough to regard it as tragic. Instead, s1 may 
now have come to color highly the choice between (say) drafting all 18-
year-olds and exempting those in college, in which case this has become 
a tragic choice for s1• In the same way a society of art connoisseurs 
(S3) might color Monet and Pissarro so highly that a choice between 
seeing one exhibition and seeing the other would be regarded by 83 as a 
tragic choice. 
It appears, then, that a part of the time Calabresi and Bobbit 
are making relativized sociological observations about the tensions 
that emerge in different societies as those societies struggle in their 
different ways to allocate scarce resources that these societies happen 
to regard as precious. At these times they are saying something like 
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this: "If there any chaps around who, like me, happen to think life is 
priceless, then they have a few problems they may not be aware of?" 
But they are saying that only at the cognitive level of their minds. 
At the gut level they so passionately believe life to be priceless 
that, when this level is articulate, they tell us that life is 
priceless, not merely that it is priceless to him. 
How can Calabresi and Bobbit be unconscious of these--to me-­
obvious shifts from sociological observations to ethical claims? They 
are hidden from them, I believe, by their repeated use of the term 
"society" in such sentences as "Society constantly affirms that life is 
priceless" (p. 135) and the term "we" in such sentences as "We hold 
life to be priceless." For my part, I would not talk about "society" 
affirming, or choosing, or deciding anything; I believe it is people 
who affirm, choose, and decide--people in voting booths, in Congress, 
in the White House, in the Oval Office. The only way I can attach 
meaning to talk about "society" valuing life (or anything else) is to 
translate it into talk about preference orderings, each preference 
ordering being the preference ordering of some particular individual at 
some particular time. I don't think these preference orderings are 
remotely as stable across time as most economists seem to think they 
are, but an individual's preference ordering can't be wildly incoherent 
over a short time period nor can there be radical divergences from one 
individual's preference ordering to another's--people could hardly live 
in a social world if this were the case. So it may be that the notion 
of a modal preference ordering for some group over some time period is 
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a meaningful concept. 
But in any society at any time--especially in any society as 
large as the U.S.--there are a great many different modal preference 
orderings, each the modal ordering for some subgroup, and that in some 
of these subgroups--teenage gangs in ghettos, the IRA, the KGB, the so­
called Islamic Jihad, the CIA, the Israeli intelligence organization-­
life has a very low rating. And even in groups all of whose members 
regard life as precious there are numerous exceptions and variations. 
Americans, to judge by the size of the headlines in newspapers and the 
time alloted on television, regard the lives of the marines lost in the 
bombing of their headquarters in Beirut as a great deal more precious 
than the lives of the French soldiers who were killed at the same time 
a few miles away. And even with regard to American lives, quite 
different rank orderings exist: some regard the lives of the hostages 
which might have been lost in the embassy at Teheran as more valuable 
than the lives which are being lost daily on the highways; others deny 
this. And so on. The most that can be claimed is that many (most) 
people in many (most) societies in many (most) circumstances regard 
life as precious--a very considerable modification of the unqualified 
claim made in Tragic Choices. 
Calabresi and Bobbit's use of the singular collective "society" 
instead of a plural collective--for instance, "people, " "group, " 
"subgroup" or "societies"--makes it easy for them to fall into thinking 
of the referent of the singular term as a single entity with a single, 
stable preference ordering, and so to overlook the fact that within any 
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society there are many different preference orderings none of which can 
be singled out as obviously the "right" one. And this inattention to 
diversity and hence inattention to the need to justify any claim that 
one ot these diverse opinions is right, is reinforced by their use of 
an indeterminate "we," which can start out by meaning himself and 
likeminded people, in which case "we prize life as priceless" is 
obviously true, and then slip without noticing that he is doing so into 
meaning by "we" "all Americans, "  in which case "we prize life as 
priceless" is obviously false. 
"Priceless" is another unfortunate term. The trouble with 
"priceless" is that it has at least three meanings--that which is not 
priced because, as it happens, no market exists for it; that which, 
being incommensurate, cannot be priced; that which is especially 
precious, rare or important. That incommensurate values are priceless 
is obvious. That they are necessary follows from the fact that they 
are incommensurate. They may indeed be priced, in the sense that a 
market may exist for them. But this price does not reflect their 
intrinsic value, only their market value. If the price of a Monet is 
twice the price of a Pissarro, some people will opt for the Pissarro, 
who might, at a different price, have opted for the Monet. A few 
people will be able to afford both; most will be able to afford 
neither. The price affects people's behavior, driving some from the 
market and attracting others, but it does not correspond to or reflect 
anybody's appreciation of the two paintings. It is meaningless to say 
that the Honet is twice as valuable as the Pissarro because its going 
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price is twice as high. 
Thus, if one eliminates "priceless" in the sense of "lacking a 
market" as irrelevant to the present discussion, one is left with two 
meanings or "priceless"--a literal meaning in which "priceless" means 
"incommensurate" and a metaphorical meaning in which it means 
"precious." Clearly, not all values that are priceless in the literal 
sense are priceless in the second, metaphorical, sense of "priceless." 
Whether they are priceless in the second sense depends on where these 
values are located in one's preference ordering, and this varies not 
only from society to society but also from individual to individual. 
But unfortunately our authors seem to notice neither the difference 
between the literal and the metaphorical meanings of "priceless" nor 
the fact that the metaphorical meaning is observer-relative. Hence 
they slip from asserting--correctly--that life and equality are 
priceless in the literal sense to taking it for granted that they are 
priceless in the second sense--not just priceless to many people in 
many societies in many circumstances, but priceless period--objectively 
priceless, priceless an und fHr sich as it were. 
Because the only values that are incommensurate (i.e., 
priceless in the first sense) for Calabresi and Bobbit happen to be 
life and equality and because these values also happen to be especially 
precious for them (i.e., priceless in the second sense), they find it 
easy to move from an "is" to an "ought"--from the correct empirical 
observation that the values some people attach to life and equality are 
incommensurate to the unsupported normative claim that they are really 
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and truly precious. If Calabresi and Bobbit were to see that in fact 
there are many incommensurate values (first sense), some of which few 
if any people regard as especially precious (second sense), they would, 
I think, see the great gap between their factual "is incommensurate" 
and their normative "is precious." But though Calabresi and Bobbit 
know, at one level of their minds, that "is precious" is context­
relative, that is, highly colored in different societies, they are 
themselves so committed to life and equality--they themselves color 
those values so highly--that the Calabresi and Bobbit whose hearts 
presided over the writing much of Chapters 1 through 5 did not hear, 
did not take in, what was being said to them by the heads that were 
writing most ot Chapters 6 and 7. 
Our authors' shift between the literal and the metaphorical 
meanings of "priceless" have had a further and even more serious 
consequence. It looks as if they concluded that since only life and 
equality are precious, that is, priceless in the metaphorical sense, 
these are a!so the only values that are priceless in the literal sense. 
Thus life and equality appear to them as exceptions, as "flaws" that 
spoil the rationality and coherence of the moral universe, which is 
otherwise as well-ordered as the rationalist philosophers tell us it 
is--well-ordered because, except for these two values, all values can 
be priced and so systematically ranked. 
So far, I have been focussing on the confusions in which 
Calabresi and Bobbit become emeshed as a consequence of taking life and 
equality as priceless. I turn now to the consequences of their belief 
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that there are but two priceless values regardless of what these values 
are. One consequence is that they perceive the choices in which their 
two incommensurate values are involved as tragic, whereas I, in 
contrast, am tempted to call the choices in which my many 
incommensurate values are invalved whimsical but will settle for 
calling them impossible. Lest this be regarded as a merely semantic 
difference between us, I will sharpen it by saying that if I had to 
choose between calling impossible (i.e., incommensurate) choices tragic 
and calling them comic, I think I would call them comic, for there 
seems to me something almost comic about the high-flown expectation 
that the world is unflawed. 
What sort of difference is it when presumably reasonable people 
who, in opposite to the rational choice theorists, agree that at least 
some cnoices are incommensurate--who agree on the facts of the case, as 
it were--see those facts so differently that are tragic to some and 
whimsical to others? I shall call this kind of difference a gestalt 
difference, which I define as one in which the same facts arrange 
themselves so differently for different people that those people see 
different pictures of the world. Look at Figure 1.8 
Figure 1 
Do you see a duck, or do you see a rabbit? The difference between 
seeing a duck and seeing a rabbit is an example of a gestalt 
difference. All of the lines in the drawing of the duck are lines in 
the drawing of the rabbit; all of the lines in the drawing of the 
rabbit are lines in the drawing of the duck. But the lines arrange 
themselves so differently in the two pictures that the lines that are 
the duck's bill in one picture are the rabbit's ears in the other. 
Everything snifts, yet nothing moves. 
Why do Calabresi and Bobbit see a rabbit where I see a duck? 
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In a simple case like this the explanation may be simple: it may be 
that they have just finished reading "Peter Rabbit" to their children, 
while I am playing "Peter and the Wolf" to mine. Further, in a simple 
case like this it is easy to shift back and forth from one gestalt to 
the other, turning duck into rabbit and rabbit back into duck at will. 
In complex cases like the difference between tragic choices and comic 
choices, it is much more difficult to make a gestalt switch. But it is 
worth trying to make it�even if, afterwards, one returns to one's 
initial gestalt--because making this kind of effort teaches us a great 
deal about theory formation and about the relativity of the theories 
thus formed to their metaphysical and cosmological context, their 
relativity, that is, to the implicit assumptions of the theorists. 
Accordingly, I am going to try to show why Calabresi and Bobbit 
see the human situation as tragic whilst I see it as comic or, better, 
whim.sical. The critical factor, I shall argue, is a difference in 
metaphysical expectations. I shall start with two preliminary 
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observations about tragedy and comedy, and about the differing 
expectations--in this case social, not metaphysical, expectations--that 
make tragedies tragic and comedies comic. First, a play is a tragedy, 
at least according to Aristotle, if the situation represented in the 
play evokes a particular kind of response--emotions of pity and 
terror.9 The first chapter of Tragic Choices is full of references to
Greek tragedians; it is evident that the authors have Aristotle in mind 
when they write that a tragic choice arouses "emotions of compassion, 
outrage and terror" (p. 18), and that it "evokes truth and arouses 
terror and outrage" (p. 23). 
What sort of situation arou ses these specifically tragic 
emotions and in virtue of arousing them, is called tragic? It is, I 
suggest, a situation in which some individual for whom we expect things 
to go well becomes involved in a wholly unexpected misfortune. It is 
the unexpectedness of the misfortune that elicits the tragic emotions. 
Oedipus was clever, energetic, and ambitious--a man for whom the 
audience would predict a successful career, and certainly the 
misfortunes that overtake him are unusual. It isn't often that a man 
bashes his father on the head at a crossroads without knowing him to be 
his father. It isn't often that a man sleeps with his mother without 
knowing her to be his mother. Fewer still are the men who suffer both 
of these unusual misfortunes. In contrast, consider the misfortunes 
that occur in Aristophanes' comedies: though these misfortunes are 
unusual--it wasn't often that sex-roles were reversed or that a man was 
denied his marriage bed in the fifth century B.C.--they are down-graded 
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and rendered comic by being represented as occurring to every Tom, Dick 
and Harry in Athens�to tanners and sausage makers, not to kings and 
princes. 
Second, the line between tragedy and comedy is narrow: a 
gestalt switch will occur if by design or as a result of bungling by 
director or actors the events occurring on the stage are taken by the 
audience not as exceptional but as just the way the world happens to 
be. The carnage that leaves the stage littered with corpses at the end 
of Hamlet would evoke roars of laughter--as actually happens during the 
not dissimilar scenes from Act V of Romeo in the film version of 
Nicholas Nickleby--if all those deaths are perceived by the audience, 
not as linked to the misfortunes of a particular protagonist, thus 
making those misfortunes unusual, but rather as routine occurrences at 
the court or Denmark or alternatively at Verona. Thus playwrights, 
directors and actors set up in their audiences expectations which lead 
either to purging tears or laughter, depending on how the events 
enacted on the stage match those expectations. 
In the same way philosophers' theories depend to a great extent 
on how well or how ill the world matches their metaphysical 
expectations. I shall give two examples. In Nausea Sartre describes 
his protagonist--a thinly disguised Sartre�at the moment he discovers 
that "things are divorced from their names." As it happens, Roquetin 
is sitting in a street car when he makes this discovery: 
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I lean my hand on the seat but pull it back hurriedly: it exists. 
This thing I'm sitting on, leaning my hand on, is called a seat. 
They make it purposely for people to sit on, they took leather, 
springs and cloth, they went to work with the idea of making a 
seat and when they finished, that was what they had made. • • • I 
murmur: "It's a seat," a little like an exorcism. But the word 
stays on my lips: it refuses to go and put itself on the 
thing. • • • It seems ridiculous to call them seats or to say 
anything at all about them; I am in the midst of things, nameless 
things.IO 
Now, by way of contrast, Hume. As it happens, Hume agrees with 
Sartre that things are divorced from their names. As he put it, all 
things are "loose and separate," including naturally words and the 
objects they refer to. But Hume, so far as I know, never sat in the 
Edinburgh equivalent of a Bouville streetcar; certainly neither there 
or elsewhere did he make Sartre's shocking discovery that the world 
simply is, that it is not meaningful to the rational human mind. It 
was not a discovery, and so not shocking, because it was something he 
had, as it were, always known. Thus Hume and Sartre both took the fact 
of looseness and separateness as a fundamental feature of the world, a 
basic premise, but they developed radically different theories because 
looseness and separateness matched Hume's expectations and frustrated 
Sartre's. 
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Thus Hume used the looseness and separateness of things to 
demonstrate that we have no good reasons our belief in the existence of 
God, in the external world or in the self. What, he asked, should be 
one's reaction as one contemplates the "havoc" thus made? Far from 
being distressing, far from inhibiting action, it frees one, he 
thought, to contemplate "the whimsical condition of mankind, who must 
act and reason and believe, though they are not able, by their most 
diligent enquiry, to satisfy themselves concerning the foundation of 
these operations, or to remove the objections, which may be raised 
against them. 1111 
Sartre's world is a lot like Hume's�he agreed with Hume that 
from looseness and separateness it follows that "the idea of God is 
contradictory" and that "man is a useless passion1112 __ but whereas Hume 
accepted the world for what it is, Sartre abominated it. The only 
appropriate response, he thought, is not cool detachment, but defiance. 
The lines in the drawing are the same, but they arrange themselves into 
a duck for Hume and into a rabbit for Sartre. 
I can now state the differences between Calabresi's and 
Bobbit's metaphysical expectations and my metaphysical expectations, 
the differences that lead them to perceive incommensurate choices as 
tragic and lead me to see such choices as whimsical. I must, I think, 
be a descendant of Hume. At least I expect the world to be full of 
incommensurate choice because I expect the world to be arational-­
rationality, in my view, is something we project on the world-­
sometimes with moderate success, sometimes with an attendant strain--
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not something we find there. Consequently, when Calabresi and Bobbit 
point out a pair of incommensurate values and show that the existence 
of these particular incommensurate values makes nonsense of all current 
allocation theories, I am not surprised and not disappointed. My duck 
has turned up in one more place. 
Calabresi and Bobbit are certainly not descendants of Hume; 
they are descendants of Descartes. So, emphatically, was Sartre; so 
are the rational choice philosophers. But like Sartre and unlike the 
rational choice theorists, Calabresi and Bobbit see that the world is 
not as rational as Descartes held it to be. However, whereas Sartre 
was persuaded that the world is au fond arational, our authors believe 
that its rationality is only "f lawed"--flawed by the presence of those 
two values that are both incommensurate and also precious. Calabresi 
and Bobbit alternate between attending to the fact that these 
incommensurate values are precious and attending to the fact that there 
are after ail only two of them. We are reminded of The Golden Bowl and 
the shopping expedition made by the Prince and Charlotte Stant to 
purchase a weading present for Maggie Verner. From Charlotte's point 
of view the flaw in the bowl that has been proposed as the gift is 
minor and in any case invisible; from the Prince's, it renders the bowl 
worthless. There is a bit of Charlotte in Tragic Choices and also a 
bit ot the Prince.13
To put the matter differently, Calabresi and Bobbit are saved 
from anything like Sartre's desperate existential adjustment to an 
arational universe by their convenient belief that the world is 
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rational except for one small "pocket" of arationality. But 
unfortunately for Calabresi and Bobbit this pocket of arationality is 
something they can neither do with nor without. Unlike the Prince, 
they cannot simply walk out of the shop and stand in the Bloomsbury 
street with their backs to its window--to have done so would have been 
to leave their book unwritten. Hence the ambivalence I have noted: 
whereas Hume is comfortably lodged in his world and Sartre is lodged, 
however uncomfortably, in his, our authors, if I read their book 
correctly, are living uneasily between two worlds; like Matthew Arnold 
they have as yet no place to rest their heads. 
So there are two worlds--the Calabresi/Bobbit world of tragic 
choices and my world of impossible choices. Just as nothing changes 
and yet everything changes as one shifts from gestalt to gestalt in 
Figure 1, so nothing changes and yet everything changes as one shifts 
from a world in which only two values are priceless in the metaphorical 
sense and, for this reason, also priceless in the literal sense to a 
world in which many values are priceless in the literal sense and some 
happen to be priceless for some people and others priceless for other 
people in the metaphorical sense. 
From my duck perspective I fear I cannot but have given a 
biased description of the Calabresi/Bobbit rabbit; try as I may I 
cannot really enter into their rabbit world. And Calabresi and Bobbit, 
were they to undertake a description of my duck world would give a 
biased description of it if they cannot, and I suspect they cannot, 
enter into my Humean perspective on the world. What is needed, it may 
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be thought, is an objective outside observer. Let him look at the two 
pictures, the rabbit picture and the duck picture; he will know which 
is correct. And let him tell us which perspective on the world--the 
perspective in which incommensurate choices are pathological or the 
perspective in which they are the way of the world--is correct. 
Well, what meaning can be attached to "correct" in those 
sentences? We understand what it means to ask whether the object of 
which I caught a fleeting glimpse as I was looking at the pond down 
there in the meadow is a duck or a rabbit. But what does it mean to 
ask whether the drawing in Figure 1 is the drawing 0£ a duck or of a 
rabbit? It is impossible to settle the issue by pointing to any 
feature of the drawing that is accounted for in one view that is not 
also accounted for in the other. Gallileo, if challenged, could call 
attention to the phases of Venus, which were accounted for nicely by 
the Copernician hypothesis but which could not be accounted for by the 
geocentric hypothesis. The drawing in Figure 1 is quite different. 
If, straining for evidence that my view is correct, I challenge 
Calabresi and Bobbit, "What about the duck's bill? You haven't 
accounted for that" they will reply, "But of course we have. Can't you 
see? That's the rabbit's ears." And if they challenge me, "You've 
left out the rabbit's mouth," I will reply, "As anyone can plainly see, 
that's a little bump on the back of the duck's head." Every feature of 
my duck is a feature of their rabbit; every feature of their rabbit is 
a feature of my duck. 
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What, then, is the point of this admittedly inconclusive 
exercise? It is to show that, though Calabresi and Bobbit are left 
with the rabbit they started with and I am still stuck with my duck, it 
is not the case that we are exactly where we were before the exercise 
was undertaken. Though I continue to see my duck, I now know, as a 
result of reading their book, that there are reasonable people who see 
a rabbit where I see a duck, and that makes a difference in the duck 
that I see: I have learned that my duck is somebody else's rabbit. 
Similarly, I could hope that if Calabresi and Bobbit were to read this 
paper their rabbit looks a little different to them. Thus, though we 
are in a sense as far apart as ever, we may yet find it possible, 
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